Monday, November 30, 2015

[MFP] Seeking consultancy

 

Hello!

 

I wanted to let you know that we are now advertising for a short term consultancy to support our Financial Inclusion strategy in Asia!

 

I would really appreciate it if you could share the link with your networks and any one you think could be interested in applying. The deadline is 10th December, so not too long away!

 

Link: http://www.careinternational.org.uk/jobs/current-vacancies/consultancy-horizon-scanning-financial-inclusion-asia

 

 

Lauren Hendricks

CARE International

Access Africa

lhendricks@care.org

Tel: 202-595-2820

Mob: 202-763-0310

Skype: lauren_hendricks

 

PLEASE NOTE NEW MOBILE PHONE NUMBER

 

__._,_.___

Posted by: "Hendricks, Lauren" <lhendricks@care.org>
Reply via web post Reply to sender Reply to group Start a New Topic Messages in this topic (1)
WARNING! If you hit REPLY, your message will go to the entire listserve, not just the original author!

.

__,_._,___

Monday, November 9, 2015

Re: [MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying

 

Dear Milford,

Thank you very much for taking time to answering me so extensively. Now that you clarify that your assertions relate to specific locations, not the whole country, I do agree with you that there are worrying signs. Financial history is littered with credit bubbles. While it is worthwhile to try to spot them and deflate them before they burst, I don't think they can be wholly prevented. They owe a lot to human nature: greed, short-termism, etc. Even if there are sober heads at some MFIs who recognize the danger, it is very hard for them to slow down if the other MFIs around them are growing and making profit at eye-catching rates.

Personally, I think that how MFIs treat defaulted clients is at least as important as preventing over-indebtedness. Regarding "debt farming", I have not come across any example of MFI confiscating lands of defaulted clients, bundling them and selling them on to property developers myself, but one possibility to spot this practice would be to look at the balance sheet of Cambodian MFIs, a publicly available information, pick up those MFIs with significant real estate on their assets side, and find out what these real estate assets are.

Good luck to your research. I look forward to hearing from your results in this forum.

Mingyee


From: "milford bateman milfordbateman@yahoo.com [MicrofinancePractice]" <MicrofinancePractice@yahoogroups.com>
To: "MicrofinancePractice@yahoogroups.com" <MicrofinancePractice@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, November 9, 2015 3:23 PM
Subject: [MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying

 
 Dear Ming-yee
 
Thanks for this comment. My own reading of the situation was based on a combination of the newspaper report, the NIS report, a recent report by the researcher Liv Dannett, a number of other reports from various institutions, plus a recent study (MIMOSA) which found that Cambodia is the 2nd highest country in terms of the level of microcredit saturation.
 
First off, I think there is some talking at cross-purposes here. In particular, your comments attempt to focus the discussion on the impact at the national level, while others, including myself, point to the specific impacts in those locations actually subject to the onslaught of the microfinance industry – the newly 'saturated' areas and poorest areas of Cambodia. I think that looking at those locations where the poor are concentrated and subject to the microfinance industry most of all, is a more useful way of looking at the impact. Otherwise, we lose track of what is going on. So, for instance, your desire to focus on the national level would have found no problem in Andhra Pradesh state in India prior to 2010, since the appalling situation there would have been largely hidden had studies brought in other non-microfinance saturated states in India and insisted on reporting an average for India. So I think this is a faulty methodology, and it probably obscures far more of importance than it reveals. In many other countries, the microfinance-driven crisis it is often specific to particular locations, and I think the same is in Cambodia. Second, with no figures for the median it is difficult to make any solid conclusion as regards anything in the data collected. Third, there are no figures for several important issues concerning the poor, such as to fund migration, which is in reality one of the commonest uses for microcredit (see the work of Maryann Bylander, for example)
 
Having said, that the NIS survey does reveal more important data about the problems that have arisen in Cambodia thanks to the constant profit-driven expansion of microfinance. On the level of debt issue, the overall figure quoted in the NIS is indeed what you say. However, this has to be offset by the rise (mainly outside of Phnom Penh) in the average loan amount (page 97, Table 8), which suggests a smaller number of households are in debt, but by much more per individual household. Moreover, total average indebtedness has increased by more than 60 per cent in the 3 years from 2011 to 2014, which is a very worrying figure. In terms of the new debt incurred to service old debt, the average level of household debt accessed in order to service or repay existing debts has increased by more than 300 per cent, going from around $US470 to $US1,500 between 2001 and 2014. Yes, this is a small percentage overall nationally, but such rapid growth is a worrying sign. Going further, with migration and mobility in Cambodia very high indeed, as noted, and with some studies showing that this arises because the poor are migrating from their communities after having lost family land forfeited to repay a defaulting microloan, this might also be a factor in the most recent figures being somewhat lower than in earlier years. Another indicator of a worsening situation is that (NIS, page 101, Table 12) the average time it takes to repay a microloan has been steadily rising since 2009, shades of 'extend and pretend' one might hypothesize.
 
Drilling down to the sub-national situation, we find things are much worse for the poor, for whom microcredit is supposed to be making things better. Consider on this geographical point the important survey by Liv Dannet (2013)
 
 
This survey found that around 9% of villages in Cambodia, mainly the poorest villages, are effectively saturated with microfinance. The recent increase in average loans might be even more cause for concern in such villages, given that the data collected by Dannet largely refers to the period up to December 2011; in other words, the data was collected prior to the latest spurt in microfinance expansion. Now the NIS figures show that multiple lending is bad if Cambodia is the subject, but very worrying indeed if the poorest regions are the subject. The Dannet survey (page 14) found that in saturated villages 28 per cent have accessed microloans from 3 MFIs, and 15 per cent from 4 or more. These are very dangerous figures, not least because they cannot be linked to any economic development or poverty reduction progress – that is, so much of this over-indebtedness is effectively being racked up with no real net impact. The objective debt measurements (page 38) show that servicing micro-debt for the very poor does indeed take up a very high percentage of their incomes, perhaps as much as the 45% figure calculated by Grant Knuckey – CEO of ANZ Royal Bank, which is a major supporter of microfinance in Cambodia – a figure he got from his reading of the NIS study.
 
I appreciate your additional comments, but they are peripheral to the fact that the situation remains very worrying and the potential for meltdown gaining ground daily. The high figure for consumption spending (@30%) as the reason for taking out a microloan is particularly worrying.  And especially when we cannot find any reliable indication that this wall of micro-debt is having a positive impact on poverty and local economic development – supposedly the whole point of the exercise – it increasingly looks to be about nothing more than a situation where the main MFIs are simply keen to continue making eye-watering returns no matter what level of over-indebtedness is racked up.
 
Milford



__._,_.___

Posted by: Hsu Ming-Yee <mingyee0706@yahoo.fr>
Reply via web post Reply to sender Reply to group Start a New Topic Messages in this topic (4)
WARNING! If you hit REPLY, your message will go to the entire listserve, not just the original author!

.

__,_._,___

[MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying

 

A lot of data here, and worth discussing. Am well aware of the recent NIS survey in Cambodia and it has some good material. Unfortunately, no time to delve into the details.


However, I just wanted to point out one important clarification. It is true that our preliminary findings in Cambodia placed it at 2nd highest globally. However, we have since revised this figure, after better understanding the multiple sources of data we were looking at -- Findex, Cambodian MF association, credit bureau, and the central bank, as well as our own targeted field survey in a few regions in the country. The result (to be published later this month) is that yes, Cambodia is still very much saturated and a serious concern, particularly given its continuing pace of growth. But it isn't 2nd highest. For now, just shy of the top 5. 

Just wanted to correct the record.

BTW, we have also mapped saturation levels by region in Cambodia, as well as several other countries.

Daniel
MIMOSA Project

__._,_.___

Posted by: danrozas@yahoo.com
Reply via web post Reply to sender Reply to group Start a New Topic Messages in this topic (3)
WARNING! If you hit REPLY, your message will go to the entire listserve, not just the original author!

.

__,_._,___

[MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying

 

 Dear Ming-yee
 
Thanks for this comment. My own reading of the situation was based on a combination of the newspaper report, the NIS report, a recent report by the researcher Liv Dannett, a number of other reports from various institutions, plus a recent study (MIMOSA) which found that Cambodia is the 2nd highest country in terms of the level of microcredit saturation.
 
First off, I think there is some talking at cross-purposes here. In particular, your comments attempt to focus the discussion on the impact at the national level, while others, including myself, point to the specific impacts in those locations actually subject to the onslaught of the microfinance industry – the newly 'saturated' areas and poorest areas of Cambodia. I think that looking at those locations where the poor are concentrated and subject to the microfinance industry most of all, is a more useful way of looking at the impact. Otherwise, we lose track of what is going on. So, for instance, your desire to focus on the national level would have found no problem in Andhra Pradesh state in India prior to 2010, since the appalling situation there would have been largely hidden had studies brought in other non-microfinance saturated states in India and insisted on reporting an average for India. So I think this is a faulty methodology, and it probably obscures far more of importance than it reveals. In many other countries, the microfinance-driven crisis it is often specific to particular locations, and I think the same is in Cambodia. Second, with no figures for the median it is difficult to make any solid conclusion as regards anything in the data collected. Third, there are no figures for several important issues concerning the poor, such as to fund migration, which is in reality one of the commonest uses for microcredit (see the work of Maryann Bylander, for example)
 
Having said, that the NIS survey does reveal more important data about the problems that have arisen in Cambodia thanks to the constant profit-driven expansion of microfinance. On the level of debt issue, the overall figure quoted in the NIS is indeed what you say. However, this has to be offset by the rise (mainly outside of Phnom Penh) in the average loan amount (page 97, Table 8), which suggests a smaller number of households are in debt, but by much more per individual household. Moreover, total average indebtedness has increased by more than 60 per cent in the 3 years from 2011 to 2014, which is a very worrying figure. In terms of the new debt incurred to service old debt, the average level of household debt accessed in order to service or repay existing debts has increased by more than 300 per cent, going from around $US470 to $US1,500 between 2001 and 2014. Yes, this is a small percentage overall nationally, but such rapid growth is a worrying sign. Going further, with migration and mobility in Cambodia very high indeed, as noted, and with some studies showing that this arises because the poor are migrating from their communities after having lost family land forfeited to repay a defaulting microloan, this might also be a factor in the most recent figures being somewhat lower than in earlier years. Another indicator of a worsening situation is that (NIS, page 101, Table 12) the average time it takes to repay a microloan has been steadily rising since 2009, shades of 'extend and pretend' one might hypothesize.
 
Drilling down to the sub-national situation, we find things are much worse for the poor, for whom microcredit is supposed to be making things better. Consider on this geographical point the important survey by Liv Dannet (2013)
 
 
This survey found that around 9% of villages in Cambodia, mainly the poorest villages, are effectively saturated with microfinance. The recent increase in average loans might be even more cause for concern in such villages, given that the data collected by Dannet largely refers to the period up to December 2011; in other words, the data was collected prior to the latest spurt in microfinance expansion. Now the NIS figures show that multiple lending is bad if Cambodia is the subject, but very worrying indeed if the poorest regions are the subject. The Dannet survey (page 14) found that in saturated villages 28 per cent have accessed microloans from 3 MFIs, and 15 per cent from 4 or more. These are very dangerous figures, not least because they cannot be linked to any economic development or poverty reduction progress – that is, so much of this over-indebtedness is effectively being racked up with no real net impact. The objective debt measurements (page 38) show that servicing micro-debt for the very poor does indeed take up a very high percentage of their incomes, perhaps as much as the 45% figure calculated by Grant Knuckey – CEO of ANZ Royal Bank, which is a major supporter of microfinance in Cambodia – a figure he got from his reading of the NIS study.
 
I appreciate your additional comments, but they are peripheral to the fact that the situation remains very worrying and the potential for meltdown gaining ground daily. The high figure for consumption spending (@30%) as the reason for taking out a microloan is particularly worrying.  And especially when we cannot find any reliable indication that this wall of micro-debt is having a positive impact on poverty and local economic development – supposedly the whole point of the exercise – it increasingly looks to be about nothing more than a situation where the main MFIs are simply keen to continue making eye-watering returns no matter what level of over-indebtedness is racked up.
 
Milford

__._,_.___

Posted by: milford bateman <milfordbateman@yahoo.com>
Reply via web post Reply to sender Reply to group Start a New Topic Messages in this topic (2)
WARNING! If you hit REPLY, your message will go to the entire listserve, not just the original author!

.

__,_._,___

Saturday, November 7, 2015

Re: [MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying the lives of the poor

 

Dear Milford,

As someone active in the Cambodian microfinance sector, I have been shocked by your assertions that 45 percent of Cambodian households are spending up to 45 percent of their income on microdebt servicing and that more than ever the principal reason for taking out a new microloan is to repay existing microloans. These very serious assertions have prompted me to go through the two sources you have cited. I can find similar assertions in the Phnom Penh Post article, but, puzzlingly, not in the underlying Ministry Report. Can you please clarify how you have come about your findings?

As a matter of fact, the impression I get from reading the government report is by far not as bleak as you say:
- The proportion of Cambodian households having a debt amounted to 31.6% of total households in 2014. The proportion has decreased from 34.2% in 2013 (p.96, table 7 in the government report).
- The main purposes of borrowing are household consumption needs (29.1% of total borrowing) and agriculture (27.1%). Servicing of existing debts accounts for 2.7% only (p.100, table 10, idem).
- Average monthly interest rate on household debt has fallen from 2.9% in 2009 to 2.6% in 2014 (p.101, table 11, idem).
- The main items in household consumption are food and beverages (44% of total expenditure) followed by housing, water and electricity (19%). Servicing of existing debt is not explicitly mentioned, so I presume that it is under "miscellaneous goods", which account for 11% of expenditure (p.107, table 2, idem).

I look forward to hearing from you. Kind regards,

Mingyee
     


Sent: Monday, November 02, 2015 12:22 PM
Subject: [MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying the lives of the poor
 
 

In this week of FI2020, it is appropriate to step back a little from the egregious PR and have a look at the growing number of country examples where the financial inclusion movement has indeed achieved its goal, and everyone is able to access as much microcredit (and other financial services) as they want, and disaster has ensued. Cambodia would appear to be one such country.
 
It has long been known that the huge and growing level of microcredit-driven over-indebtedness among Cambodia's poor has inflicted serious damage on their lives and future prospects. Very few micro-businesses have succeeded in the artificially-created hyper-competitive local markets, and the very many micro-business failures have all too often plunged their hapless owners into even deeper poverty. One of the worst aspects of all has been that failed micro-business owners often have to forfeit long-held family land to repay their unrepayable microdebt, especially around the capital city of Phnom Penh. Indeed, some of the main MFIs are now the owners of significant property assets as a result of defaulted clients simply handing over their land as full and final repayment of their microdebt, which they then bundle up into a larger bloc and sell on to property developers at a very high price.  There is much talk on Cambodian websites and in local newspapers that this phenomenon is a deliberate accumulation strategy being adopted by some of the major MFIs in Cambodia, and elsewhere in the region (such as in Myanmar) – it is known as 'debt farming'  – which would be pretty scary if true. I have only come across partial evidence for this phenomenon, but maybe someone else has strong evidence of this taking place?
 
Of course, this encroaching disaster is water off a duck's back for the senior managers and equity shareholders in the main microcredit institutions in Cambodia, notably ACLEDA and AMK, who have long been doing very well in recent years thanks to high salaries and bonuses for managers, and generous dividends and share capital appreciation for equity holders. However, according to the latest survey by the Ministry of Planning's National Institute of Statistics conducted in collaboration with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the extent of the damage inflicted by microcredit sector on Cambodia's poor would now appear to be reaching a crescendo. This survey revealed, first of all, that a whopping 45 per cent of Cambodian households are spending up to 45 per cent of their income on microdebt servicing. This is hardly a scenario associated with poverty reduction and sustainable progress for Cambodia's poor. Second, and even worse, more than ever the principal reason for taking out a NEW microloan is simply to repay a bundle of EXISTING microloans. This would appear to suggest that the microcredit sector in Cambodia has now reached the final stage of the boom-to-bust financial cycle under capitalism described by the great US financial economist, Hyman Minsky – the famous 'Ponzi stage', where new debt is largely taken on simply to cover the installments due on existing debt. One might therefore speculate that the end for Cambodia's microcredit sector cannot be too far off. So before they push other developing countries down the same damaging 'universal financial inclusion' trajectory as in Cambodia, the FI2020 folks might first provide an explanation for why things are going so seriously off the rails there and what might be done about it?
 
A good local article on the issue is this one:
 
 
The original NIS report produced by the Ministry of Statistics can be found here:
 
 
If anyone has any further insights into the deteriorating situation in Cambodia, please get in touch (I'm preparing a report for one of the international development agencies on microcredit-driven over-indebtedness and Cambodia is one of the countries I was asked to look at)
 
 
Milford
 
 



Avast logo
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
www.avast.com



__._,_.___

Posted by: Hsu Ming-Yee <mingyee0706@yahoo.fr>
Reply via web post Reply to sender Reply to group Start a New Topic Messages in this topic (5)
WARNING! If you hit REPLY, your message will go to the entire listserve, not just the original author!

.

__,_._,___

[MFP] Re: Microcredit-driven financial inclusion in Cambodia is destroying

 

Konrad
 
Thanks for this. You are so very right in saying that it is vitally important to assess and condemn how much tribute is being passed up from Cambodia's poor to the wealthy managers and equity holders of the main MFIs. Judging by the way that wealthy hedge funds and investment houses were jostling for position to take an equity stake in the hugely profitable ACLEDA Bank – Cambodia's largest microcredit bank (in fact, Cambodia's largest bank overall) – the chance to make some serious money for shareholders by engaging with Cambodia's poor has been very widely recognized, and it is clearly the primary motive behind the rapid expansion of Cambodia's microfinance sector. Many working in Cambodia are even proud of the fact that they are making out like bandits at the expense of the poor. The newly appointed Chairman and long-time Vice-Chairman at ACLEDA, and former merchant banker, John Brinsden, remarked in an interview in 2014 as follows:
 
 "One day, my former Standard Chartered Bank chairman said to me:  "How are the mighty fallen!" when he heard I was working for a micro-finance organization (ACLEDA).  I replied: 'When you get 24 per cent return on investment, you can come and see me and I might give you a job," Brinsden chuckles.
 
 
Of course, some of the Cambodian MFIs are fighting back against the charges that they are profiteering at the expense of Cambodia's poor, though often in rather silly ways. For instance, I'm not sure what he was trying to achieve, but one senior manager at AMK, a Mr Marcus Fedder, was so angry at a previous article I did on Cambodia that he decided to post on Amazon the very next day a short but nasty 'review' of my 2010 book:
 
 
At any rate, as the old NGOs are converted over to commercial respectability or go under, this profiteering at the expense of the poor has become the stake that is being driven into the heart of the microfinance industry in Cambodia and everywhere else, and also that of its equally cynical anti-developmental successor, the global financial inclusion industry.
 
I find the best account of what's going on to be a just-out book by Dr Phil Mader who is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex in the UK, entitled "The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty". Based on his award-winning PhD thesis (disclosure – I was on his advisory board) he has produced a remarkably direct and damning critique of the exploitative 'acumen;action by dispossession' tendencies inherent to market-driven commercialised microfinance.
 
 
Milford

__._,_.___

Posted by: milford bateman <milfordbateman@yahoo.com>
Reply via web post Reply to sender Reply to group Start a New Topic Messages in this topic (1)
WARNING! If you hit REPLY, your message will go to the entire listserve, not just the original author!

.

__,_._,___